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THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
By W. M. Reisman *
"There's th' internaytional coort, ye say, but I say where ar-re th'
polis? A coort's all r-right enough, but no coort's any good onless
it is backed up by a continted constabulary."
per M[r. Dooley, An International Police Force (1899).
The world community is not on the brink of Armageddon because of a
paucity of legal answers. Legal institutions exist. Moreover, any prob-
lem, without respect to the identity of the decision-maker, may be solved
"legally": by impartial assessment of the facts and formulation of a de-
cision by reference to the parties' commitments as well as to overriding
community policies.' Mlost frequently the real problem is not in arriving
at an answer in law, but in enforcing an answer in law. In the final analy-
sis, law is not only, as the Legal Realists contend, what the courts say 2
but also what the sheriff does. Law comprises not only the verbal pro-
nouncements of authoritative organs, but also the established patterns of
behavior of the individuals composing society. In a lawfully ordered
* Research Associate, Yale Law School. The material in this article is drawn in
part from a book, to be published by Yale University Press, on Nullity and Enforce-
ment in International Law.
I The term "legal" rather than "judicial" is used to characterize the decisions
with which we are concerned in order to avoid exclusive reference to courts. In inter-
national law, in fact, the term adjudication has been used generally to refer to any
process of peaceful dispute settlement. For a classic example, see 1 Moore, Interna-
tional Adjudications xii (1929). Professor Quincy Wright states: "Broadly defined,
adjudication includes dispute settlement by a political body such as the United Nations
Security Council or a national legislature in whose decision-making political interests
are important; . . .All such bodies, however, are supposed to administer justice and
to be guided by considerations of equity when dealing with disputes .... I" Wright
"Adjudication," Dictionary of the Social Sciences 9 (Gould and Kolb eds., compiled
by UNESCO, 1964). For a comparable inclination, see Bin Cheng, General Principles
of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 292 (1953).
2 ",The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law." Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harvard Law
Rev. 457, 461 (1897). ". . . the law consists of the rules recognized and acted on by
courts of justice." Salmond on Jurisprudence 41 (11th ed., Williams ed., 1957). See
also Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 117 (2nd ed., 1921). The legal realist
position is not so much incorrect as limited to a particular phase of social development.
In a highly organized society, there is a close correlation between what the court says
and what, in fact, is done. A court pronouncement "triggers" enforcement; hence, to
state that the law is "what the courts say" includes governmental implementation. In
international law there is no such correlation, no "automatic triggering." Thus,
what the courts say may have no effect on behavior. For a demonstration of the point,
compare the I.C.J. Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,
Paragraph 2, of the Charter), [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, and its subsequent disregard by
Members of the United Nations.
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society there is a high correlation between authoritative pronouncement
and popular behavioral conformity. In a lawfully effective society policies
of commonweal, clarified by authorized procedures, can be enforced in the
face of a recalcitrant minority.8
Considering its socio-legal importance, international enforcement has
enjoyed relatively meager doctrinal attention. One group of scholars has
assumed that the major factor producing compliance in international law
is "conscience" or "compelling morality." 4 Clearly, the moral drive to
rectitude-the ego's demand on itself for ethical behavior-can be a force
towards compliance. r Frequently moral or ethical drives are a result of
community conditioning; rarely do they alone sustain systematic decision
in a community. The United States, to cite one example, is an organized,
relatively homogenous society. Is there an American lawyer, who, on
informing a client that his case has been lost, has not been asked: "Do
we have to abide by it?" "Can they make it stick?" In an interna-
tional society in -which several hostile authority systems contend, compli-
ance for reasons of morality alone is improbable.
A second approach to enforcement simply presumes compliance. In
numerous statements, the Permanent Court and the International Court
of Justice have refused even to consider the possibility of non-compliance. 0
8 History is replete with societies in which no attempt was made to implement
"legislation." The earliest documented example appears to be Hammurabi's code:
see Finkelstein, "1Ammisaduqa's Edict and the Babylonian 'Law Codes,' " 15 J. Cunei-
form Studies 91 (1961). In 19th-century France, the administration paid no attention
to Parliamentary pronouncements: Luethy, France against Herself 40 ff. (1955).
Although these societies functioned, they were incapable of adapting to rapid changes
and of directing their own fate. In crisis they -were paralyzed. Hence they were law-
fully ineffective.
4Root, "The Sanction of International Law," 1908 Proceedings, American Society
of International Law 14, 16-17; Taft's concept of a "conscience of nations," 1911
ibid. 340-341; Judge Hutcheson's famous "just opinion" in the Ryan claim, 1
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 14-15 (1940). For a recent invocation of the
"compelling moral force" of decisions, see Gormley, "The Status of the Awards of
International Tribunals: Possible Avoidance Versus Legal Enforcement," 10 Howard
L.J. 40, 59 (1964).
5Vattel rested the entire basis of international law upon an internal "law of con-
science." Friedmann, Legal Theory 34 (2nd ed., 1949), construes this to be a denial
of international law. Pound, "Philosophic Theory and International Law," 1
Bibliotheca Visseriana 71, 76 (1923), suggests that since classical international law
was directed personally to individual sovereigns, the idea of personal conscience was
not the fictitious concept which the current "state conscience" is. Even the concept
of state conscience may be too broad for proper analysis. Since it is ultimately indi-
viduals who prescribe and apply international law, their personal ethics and internal
demands for rectitude will clearly affect their decisions. See Corbett,, Morals, Law
and Power in International Relations 11, 14, 15 (1956). It may be conceded that this
drive is one factor, but certainly not the only factor in compliance.
eIn the Case of the B.S. 'Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1 at 32 (1923), the
British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments petitioned the Court, under the
relevant provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, to find that Germany had wrongfully
refused passage through the Kiel Canal to the B.S. Wimbledon. The Court found that
Germany had acted wrongly and awarded the French Government damages, but refused
[Vol. 63
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Yet the practice of the Courts shows a refined sensitivity to the problem.
When the Court anticipated that a state was likely to impugn a judgment,
it not infrequently disseised itself of jurisdiction.7 In other cases issues
to consider contingent punitive interest for delay in payment: "The Court does not
award interim interest at a higher rate in the event of the judgment not being com-
plied with at the expiration of the time fixed for compliance. The Court neither can
nor should contemplate such a contingency." (Ibid. at 32.) In the Readaptation phase
of Mavrommatis (Judgment No. 10 (Jurisdiction)), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 11 at 4
(1927), the Greek Government, in its reply to the British preliminary objection, con-
tended that the United Kingdom had disregarded "its international obligations."
The Court very carefully distinguished this claim from the contention that the U.K.
had not complied with its previous Mavrommatis judgment: "In these circumstances,
the Court does not find it necessary to consider the question whether in certain cases,
it might have jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning the non-compliance with the
terms of one of its judgments." (Ibid. at 13-14.) An extremely instructive case
in this regard is the advisory opinion, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 229. The three defendant states had refused
to appoint national arbitrators to a commission empowered to hear claims of violations
of the human rights provisions in the Peace Treaties. In the first phase of the case
the Court indicated that the national arbitrators should be appointed, but refused to
consider contingent measures in default of appointment, presuming that a state would
comply with it treaty obligations. In the interim the three states refused to comply,
and in the second phase the Court held that there was no remedy in its power for this
breach of international responsibility. [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 229.
7 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (Preliminary Objections), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93, is
the most instructive example of this point. In that case, the United Kingdom sought
to bring Iran before the Court on the basis of an Iranian declaration of adhesion under
Article 36. It was apparent that Iran would not comply with any judgment which
might have ensued. By extremely restrictive interpretation, the Court found itself
without jurisdiction. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Read observed that some twenty
days before the Court had upheld its jurisdiction under a similar adhesion in the
Ambatielos Case (Preliminary Objections), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. at 38, ". . .notwith-
standing that a restrictive construction of the jurisdictional clause would have led,
inevitably, to an opposite result." (Ibid. at 143.) In the Case Concerning the Aerial
Incident of 27 July 1955 (Preliminary Objections), [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 127, in which
Israel sought to bring Bulgaria before the Court for downing an Israeli civilian carrier
which strayed into Bulgarian airspace, the Court disseised itself of jurisdiction, re-
fusing to construe the Bulgarian declaration of adhesion of 1921 to the P.C.I.J. as
operative vis-d-vis the I.C.J., under Art. 36(5) of the Statute. The Declaration of
1921 had been made when Bulgaria was a kingdom. Subsequently Bulgaria became
Communist. It was highly improbable that she would have complied with a judgment.
In a joint dissent, four judges, among them Sir Herseh Lauterpacht, argued that the
Court's construction would cut away a good deal of its jurisdiction. Subsequently,
in the Case Concerning Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (New
Application: 1962-Preliminary Objections), [1964] I.C.J. Rep. 4, the Court seised
jurisdiction, overruling the majority opinion in the Aerial Incident ease and adopting
the minority view. The close relationship between the power of the Court and its
willingness to seise jurisdiction has been noted by Schechter, in a comparison with the
practice of international administrative courts: ". . .the liberal views of jurisdiction
taken by the administrative courts . . . has been taken in an area where practical
requirements do not demand an excessive measure of judicial restraint in deciding
jurisdictional issues. The infinite delicacies of questions of infringemefit of state
sovereignty and of effectiveness of decisions rendered without prior approval of the
judicial mechanism by the state or states concerned have no reference to international
1969]
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were formulated restrictively " or the final judgment was almost Delphic
in ambiguity.9 Although these prophylactic measures preserve the Court
from the indignity of an impugned judgment, they expose the limited
r~le of a tribunal not buttressed by an enforcement mechanism.
A third approach to enforcement has been a counsel of despair: En-
forcement, it is argued, is synonymous with social change which proceeds
at the tempo of the community at large and cannot be accelerated or
directed.10 Thus, Professor Triska avers that the problem does not lie
in the conformity of social reality with law, but of law with social reality. 1
administrative problems." Schechter, Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by
International Administrative Tribunals 130 (1964); accord, Lauterpacht, The De-
velopment of International Law by the International Court 91, 243 (1958).
s On restrictive formulations of jurisdictional clauses, see note 7 above. In the Case
Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory, [1957] I.0.J. Rep. 125; [1960]
I.C.". Rep. 61, a case with admittedly delicate political overtones, the Court found that
Portugal had a right of passage in 1955; at the time of decision Goa had already
been annexed by India! The decision did little more than confirm the statum quo at
two points in time. In the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Preliminary
Objections), [1963] I.C.5. Rep. 38, the Court refused to take jurisdiction, saying:
"The Court must discharge the duty to which it has already called attention-the duty
to safeguard the judicial function." In the Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from
Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question), [1954] 1C.J. Rep. 19, the Court applied an
extremely restrictive and not logically exhaustive construction of the Washington
Agreement in order to defeat the attachment strategy of the Three Powers (for de-
tailed discussion, see note 73 below). In the Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, [1950] 1.O.J. Rep. 65, 221, the
Court refused to apply an ut res 'magis construction to the provisions of the Peace
Treaties contemplating the arbitral commissions. It was apparent from comportment
following the first phase of the case that the defendant states would not have complied.
9 In the Asylum Case, [1950] I.0.J. Rep. 266, the Court was asked to determine
whether asylum granted to Sr. Haya de la Torre by the Colombian Embassy in Lima,
Peru, was in accordance with the Havana Convention on Asylum to which both litigants
were parties, and, if so, whether Peru was bound to accord safe passage to Haya out
of the country. The Court held that Colombia was not qualified to make a unilateral
and definitive characterization of Haya's alleged offenses as falling within the purview
of the Convention, and that the grant of asylum had been prolonged beyond the period
sanctioned in Art. 2(2) of the Convention. On the day on which this judgment was
handed down, Colombia, invoking Art. 60 of the Statute of the Court, asked for an
interpretation of the judgment: specifically, did the judgment mean that Colombia was
obliged to surrender Haya to the Government of Peru. In its judgment on this matter,
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the Asylum
Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 395, the Court refused to interpret, holding that the fact that
the decision was obscure to one party, but perfectly clear to the other, did not make a
dispute. But the Asylum judgment proved obscure to both parties and, in a subsequent
joint submission, they asked how it was to be executed, Haya de a Torre Case, [1951]
LC.J. Rep. 71. The Court held that Colombia must terminate the asylum, but that
Colombia was under no obligation to surrender Haya to Peru!
1OGossett, "The Law: Leader or Laggard in Our Society," 51 A.B.A.J. 1131
(1965).
11 "Compliance with law depends on many things .. .and cardinally in my opinion,
on the perceived distance between social reality and the respective legal norm which
is designed to order that social reality. . . This is why I would submit that it is not
enough to ask how to cause compliance of social reality with law, but also how to cause
[Vol. 63
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The extent to which the organized community can implement its policies
presents a formidable sociological problem.12  Undoubtedly, the immedi-
ate realization of a variety of programs is unfeasible; the consumption of
social values required for implementation would exceed the promised gains.
However, effectuation of social programs is usually a gradual process;
decisions moving towards realization can always be made. Since any de-
cision will exhibit some degree of conformity or nonconformity with
projected goals, it is inaccurate to assume that there is no possibility of
enforcement. Each envisaged program will require a unique strategy,
timetable and social investment for its realization.
The analytical distinction between adjudication and enforcement ' 3 has
tended to insulate consideration of the issue from lawyers. By implication
courts and lawyers-the Levites of courts-are not concerned with post-
adjudicative processes.' 4  Although we frequently invoke Montesquieu's
tripartite distinction, no lawyer denies judge-made law or feels that case
law is beyond the perimeters of his m6tier. The lawyer's agility in vault-
ing artful distinctions must be directed to the adjudication-enforcement
dichotomy. Another impediment has been the "political-legal" distinction,
the core of which in international law is simply that what the organized
compliance of law with social reality." Triska, "Different Perceptions of Agreements
and Disagreements," 1964 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 61. The
point is well taken, sed quaere if this is the "cardinal" factor in compliance. It is
one factor, possibly important in certain contexts. Yet given a "social reality" on a
course towards self-decimation, little is gained by rearranging the law so that it
sanctions destruction. In those circumstances in which the gap between "ought" and
"is" is great, the challenge to lawyers and scholars is to secure a measure of com-
pliance notwithstanding. For a reduetio of Triska's thesis see Fisher, "The Veto as a
Means of Making Third-Party Settlement Acceptable," ibid. 123. He assumes that
enforcement is impossible, hence the alternatives are to have (1) no adjudicative insti-
tutions or (2) one subject to a de jure veto. But if, as this article contends, enforce-
ment is not necessarily impossible, the proposed veto deprives enforcement of one
potential base of power, the authority of the pronouncement which is to be implemented.
12For a perspective on the problem, see Roche and Gordon, "Can Morality be
Legislated," New York Times Magazine, May 22, 1955, reproduced in part in Auerbach
(et al.), The Legal Process 311-317 (1961). The primary work in this area, though its
authority has diminished, is Sumner, A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages,
Manners, Customs, Mores and Morals (1907). For a recent critique and re-analysis of
the problem by a sociologist but from the standpoint of the lawyer, see Rose, "Socio-
logical Factors in the Effectiveness of Projected Legislative Remedies," 11 J. Legal
Ed. 470 (1959).
13 Tuncel, Ex6eution des Deisions de la Cour Internationale de Justice d 'apr~s la
Charte des Nations Unies 13-16 (1960); Rosenne, The International Court of Justice
74, 77-79 (1957); Deutsch, "Problems of Enforcement of Decrees of International
Tribunals," 50 A.B.A.J. 1134 (1964).
24 Thus, a review of a recent treatise criticized the absence of a discussion of enforce-
ment but added apologetically that ". . . the problem of enforcement [is] admittedly
a problem of government rather than law. . ... 1" Potter, review of Friedmann, The
Changing Structure of International Law (1964), 60 A.J.I.L. 130 (1966). This writer
must state that he grasps neither the distinct empirical reference of "law" and
"government" in this context nor the relevance of the sought distinction.
1969]
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community can do is "legal," what it cannot do is "political." 15 To
assume that enforcement is "political" is to beg the question.
I
Enforcement refers to the transformation, by community means, of
authoritative pronouncement into controlling reality. Organized com-
munities enforce their authority in two ways: By direct enforcement they
supervise the physical transfer of what was decreed in authoritative de-
cision. By indirect enforcement they impose sanctions on the miscreant
in order to persuade him to comply with community norms.10 Direct
enforcement is frequently substitutive, i.e., the community arranges for the
physical transfer of an equivalent in value to the original object of
decision.17
The community may resort to indirect enforcement because it is simply
incapable of enforcing its authority directly. The assets in question may
1 "... the term 'political dispute' may include all disputes, whether or not they
involve legal questions, which a State refuses to submit to judicial settlement either
in accordance with the lex 7ata or de Zege ferenda .... "' Briggs, The Law of Nations
1043 (2nd ed., 1952). "Any conflict between States as wel as between private
persons is economic or political in character; but that does not exclude the possibility
of treating the dispute as a legal one." Kelsen, "Compulsory Adjudication of Inter-
national Disputes," 37 A.T.I.L. 401-402 (1943). See also, Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations 478-479 (1950); Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International
Community 51 ff. (1933).
16 The traditional Austinian definition of sanctions, "the evil which will probably
be incurred in case a command be disobeyed . . ." (Austin, The Province of Xurls-
prudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence 15 (Hart Introduction,
1954)), focusing on the deprivatory effect, tends to limit attention to community treat-
ment of criminal behavior: Lasswell and Arens, In Defense of Public Order 14 (1961);
Hart, the Concept of Law 24 (1961). The spectrum of techniques by which a modern
community supports its laws includes indulgences as well as deprivations, the carrot
as well as the stick. See Lasswell and Arens, "Toward a General Theory of Sanc-
tions," 49 Iowa Law Rev. 233, 234 (1964). The following definitions emphasizing
function rather than the specific sanctions used in a given period, tend to assimilate
direct and indirect enforcement: "Action taken by members of the international com-
munity against an infringement, actual or threatened, of the law."2 International
Sanctions, a Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs 16 (1938); "Deprivations or indulgences of individual and group norms for
the purpose of supporting the primary norms of a public order system .... 1' Lass-
well and Arens, op. cit. at 14; ". . . there are ample sanctions (in international law)
if sanctions be defined as implementing techniques or available base values-at the
disposal of the general community of states .... 2" MeDougal, "The Impact of
International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective," 4 S. Dak.
Law Rev. 25, 50-51 (1959). On the principle of "sanction equivalents," see Dession,
"The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law," 5 Buffalo
Law Rev. 22, 32 (1955).
17 In primitive phases of commercial development, irreplaceable value is attached to
specific objects, e.g., a bailment of coins to a money-lender requires return of precisely
those coins. As concepts of value become more sophisticated, scales of equivalence
permit substituted performance and, hence, freer commercial flow. Thus, in the de-
velopment of common law, the trend has been from debt to detinue and from specific
performance to substitutive performance.
(Vol. 63
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be out of jurisdiction or intangible, hence not subject to seizure and
transfer. They may have been consumed in delicto; hence sanctions dem-
onstrate community opprobium prospectively. In other instances direct
enforcement is possible, but the community chooses indirect instrumentali-
ties for other reasons. They may be more economical, more expeditious
or may encounter less resistance.
International enforcement theories were forged when the interaction
between nations was relatively low. The assets of any one state were
usually found within its territorial bounds. Since direct enforcement
would have required physical intervention, indirect enforcement alone
seemed feasible.18  Massive changes in the international context have
rendered this line of thinking anachronistic. As the level of international
interaction has risen and as governmental programs have broadened, an
enormous quantity of state assets is found abroad. Contemporary enforce-
ment theory should concentrate on the hitherto neglected possibilities of
direct and substitutive enforcement.
In an organized community the expectation of the effectiveness of en-
forcement mechanisms is a factor inducing compliance. Enforcement be-
comes a "self-fulfilling prophecy." 19 In an unorganized polity, in which
the record of enforcement is erratic, active measures are required in a
larger number of cases. If these measures are successful, expectations
of effectiveness are generated, permitting enforcement machinery subse-
quently to fulfill its function by symbolic presence rather than by active
intervention. If the measures are unsuccessful or equivocal, voluntary
compliance will remain low. The impact of success or failure on ex-
pectations of future effectiveness emphasizes the exigency of care in the
very choice of cases for enforcement.
20
In a well-organized community power is concentrated in an authorized
and centralized enforcement agency: the sheriff, and, on the macronational
scale, the executive branch. Jeremiads about the unenforceability and
"non-law" quality of international law21 stem, in great part, from the
fruitless search for a comparable centralized, organic international sheriff.
Such an institution does not exist. 2  This does not mean that international
law must remain sanctionless:
18 League of Nations Covenant, Art. 16, pars. 1-4; U.IN. Charter, Arts. 41 and 42.
In neither document is there express mention of direct means of enforcement, an over-
sight which appears to stem from anachronistic thinking in this area.
19 Roche and Gordon, Zoo. cit. note 12 above, at 314.
20 Since enforcement does not take place in a vacuum, but cuts directly into the
warp and woof of the social fabric, the anticipated responses of the entire community
or of that section of the community affected by the decision are a major factor in
choosing direct enforcement or a particular weapon from the "sanction arsenal" in
indirect enforcement. See Landis, The Administrative Process 90-91 (1938).
21 See Austin, op. cit. note 16 above, at 12, 127, 142, 201; Patterson, Jurisprudence:
Men and Ideas of the Law 175-178 (1953).
22 For discussion of the putative r3le of the Security Council under Art. 94(2) of
the Charter, see below at p. 14.
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The real difference in this respect between municipal and interna-
tional law is not that the one is sanctioned and the other is not, but
that in the one the sanctions are organized in a systematic procedure
and that in the other they are left indeterminate. The true problem
for consideration is therefore not whether we should try to create
sanctions for international law, but whether we should try to organize
them in a system. 3
The creation of an organic, international sheriff is a long-range goal. In
the interim a functional system 24 of international enforcement can be an
instrument for preserving current minimum order and for laying the
groundwork for future institutionalization of the world community.
A functional system is based on the political-legal elements at play in
an enforcement process: community authority and effective power. The
relevant social context is scrutinized and combinations of authority and
effective power, which can act functionally as an enforcement system, are
arranged. From the spectrum of possible relationships, that combination
which can enforce most economically, yet poses the least jeopardy to inter-
national peace, is chosen.
The functional system is applied, almost intuitively, by the lawyer seek-
ing to gain judgment execution in another jurisdiction. The lawyer who
has gained a judgment in province A, but cannot execute there, will seek
execution in a province having control over the assets of the judgment
debtor. If provinces B, C and D each have control of adequate assets,
the choice of an enforcing forum will turn on other factors: attitudes
toward foreign judgments, complexity or simplicity of procedure, bond
requirements, geographical distance, etc. One province will present the
most attractive opportunities for enforcement. International enforcement
is more complex. Many of the factors which were predictably stable in a
municipal arena manifest heightened variability and sensitivity to po-
litical crisis in international law. 26 Hence numerous factors which mu-
nicipal counsel need not consider must be scrutinized systematically by
international lawyers.
A functional method of enforcement which adapts and systematizes the
intuitive approach of the municipal lawyer in extra-jurisdictional enforce-
ment is presented here. The subject for enforcement is a hypothetical
23 Brierly, "Sanctions in International Law," in Lauterpacht and Waldocl, The Basis
of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers of the Late James Leslie Brierly
212 (1952).
24 " Functional" is used to refer to the components of the act of enforcement, rather
than to the organ which is supposed to perform the act. Due to the absence of a
centralized international enforcer, a conventional "organic" approach is of limited
utility.
25 To cite the most obvious case, if we assume that nation-state A is capable of en-
forcing an award or judgment most effectively and economically, we may discover that
while A is willing to enforce P's award against D, it is unwilling to enforce it
against D1. This may be because the basis of enforcement is a commercial treaty
which does not extend to D1 or because D1 is a member of the same political bloc.
For further discussion of this aspect of enforcement, see below at p. 9.
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I.C.J. decision.2 6  Primary attention is given to direct and substitutive
enforcement, though the possibilities for indirect enforcement are examined
cursorily. This model has two objectives: to secure compliance with I.C.J.
judgments and at the same time to generate expectations of an effective
international enforcement system, favorable to the ultimate creation of a
centralized international enforcer.
The functional model of enforcement comprises four elements: the target
state, which has lost the judgment, the enforcers, the power bases of en-
forcers applicable to the enforcement problem at hand, and the strategies
to be employed. 27
1. Enforcers: Potential enforcers include general international organi-
zations, functional agencies, regional organizations, nation-states acting
jointly or severally and non-official groups of individuals. Not all of these
entities have direct control over the assets of the target state. Neverthe-
less, a state with control will frequently find it easier to act if it is "di-
rected" by an authoritative organization. A strategy of enforcement may
co-ordinate a controlling state and a non-controlling but highly authori-
tative organization. For example, if certain assets of the target state
are in republic X, its government might find it inexpedient to transfer
these assets to state Y, the judgment creditor, solely on the basis of Y's
request. The target state would interpret the act as hostile and might
retaliate. It is recommended that Y move that an international organiza-
tion "enjoin" X to transfer the assets, thereby permitting X to participate
in enforcement without bearing primary responsibility. If the target state
or its ally were capable of vetoing an injunction in a general organization,
Y is urged to seek a regional or specialized organization in which the target
does not enjoy a veto power.
26The model may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the enforcement of any other
international decision, e.g., arbitral awards, Security Council decisions, etc. In a
number of senses, an I.C.J. judgment is easier to enforce. The concept of the finality
of a res judicata tends to augment the authority of judicial decisions. An arbitral
award may be vitiated by a claim of nullity in international law, see Balasko, Causes
de Nullit6 de la Sentence Arbitrale en Droit International Public (1938). Similarly,
the decisions of any international organization, operating under the regime of an
interntional treaty, may be challenged for being in excs de pouvoir or vltra vires
the intrurnent: see Certain Expenses, loc. cit. note 2 above. I.C.J. judgments, on
the other hand, are allegedly immune from such lateral attacks. In the Awards of the
Adnfinistrative Tribunals, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47, the Court stated that the awards of a
permanent tribunal, functioning under a special statute and within an organized legal
system, were not susceptible to nullity (ibid. at 55-56). This holding would appear to
include judgments of the Court. In an individual opinion, Judge Winiarski took
exception to this point (ibid. at 65).
27 Within the limits of this article, only a truncated version of the model can be
presented. A comprehensive system of functional enforcement would comprise (1)
Enforcers and Targets; (2) Their Perspectives; (3) Potential Enforcement Arenas;
(4) Bases of Power of both Enforcers and Targets; (5) Strategies of Modalities of
Enforcement; (6) Enforcement Outcomes; (7) Post-Outcome Effects, i.e., trends
toward or away from the institutionalization and centralization of international en-
forcement. The four phases which are not discussed expressly in the text have been
assimilated to the other three.
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The subjectivities of the elites in potential enforcing polities are of
major significance. Do elites tend to identify themselves with the target
or the creditor state? Do they commit themselves to an international
program which favors peaceful resolution of disputes? Does the judg-
ment in question offend their own public policies? These factors are
indicators of the willingness (as opposed to capacity) of third-party states
to participate in enforcement.
2. Power Bases: Power bases of enforcers divide into authority and
effective power. The latter is expressed in military and economic might.
A community authorizes its sheriff to implement pronouncements and vests
in him enough effective power for the task. The felicitous conjunction of
authority and control is rarely found in one entity in international law.
Certain organizations enjoy a general mandate to enforce, 28 but have
neither direct control over assets nor the capacity to acquire it. Effective
power is primarily vested in states. In exceptional cases it is found in
functional organizations. 29  Ideally, enforcement is compounded of both
authority and effective power; consequently entity combinations must be
forged.
The conventional combination consists of a directive from an authori-
tative organization to a controlling organization or state. Unfortunately,
applications for enforcement directives in the United Nations can be
blocked. 0 Directives from regional or functional organizations have a
higher probability of success, though their judgment-enforcement au-
thority is more tenuous. Where recommended combinations are unfeasible,
joint or unilateral action must be pursued. Depending upon the context,
such actions may acquire an ad hoc authority.31
28 Thus, the Security Council under U.N. Charter, Art. 94, par. 2, and the Council
of the League of Nations under the Covenant, Art. 13, par. 4.
29 Notably the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank. For discussion of
their potential enforcement r0le, see below at p. 16.
80 U.N. Charter, Art. 27, par. 3. Rosenne, The International Court of Justice 107-
108 (1957), is of the opinion that the veto will not be used against action under Art.
94(2), for ". . . the Security Council is unlikely to set about wilfully destroying the
power of the Court .... 11 There is little to support this optimism. Moreover, it is
difficult to imagine that the U.S.S.R., which is doctrinally antipathetic to international
adjudication, is anxious to maintain or to extend the power of the Court. After the
I.C.J. had indicated interim measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1951] I.O.J.
Rep. 89, the United Kingdom lodged the question of the decision's enforcement on the
agenda of the Security Council under Arts. 35 and 94 (U.N. Security Council, Official
Records, Supp., 1951, Doe. S/2357). Although the extended procedural discussions
were superseded by events, the verbatim record indicates that the U.S.S.R. would have
vetoed any enforcement measure against Iran.
1 pThe henomenon of state officials acting functionally as international decision-
makers has been termed d~doublement fonationnel; for an exposition by the coiner
of the term, see Scelle, "Le Ph~nombne juridique du ddoublement fonctionnel," in
Schiitzel and Schlochauer, Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation: Festschrift
fur Hans Wehberg 324 (1956). For a comparable description, see Kelsen, Principles
of International Law 12-14, 21, 25 (1952). For a critique of the doctrine, see Fried-
mann, The Changing Structure of International Law 148 (1964). The concept is of
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3. Strategies: The Charter sets out a spectrum of sanctions for indirect
enforcement, 2 but there is no comparable enumeration of techniques for
direct or substitutive enforcement. In fact, the world community's
arsenal is well stocked with such techniques: attachment, garnishment,
liens, freezing of assets, restrictive licensing, dumping, termination of aid,
etc. Sovereign immunity, which is likely to be invoked as a defense, is
subservient to the duty to comply.3 It is not an absolute right; im-
utmost importance to a functional system of international enforcement. Coercive acts
which would ordinarily be considered delictual become lawful if the community employs
them for a valid purpose, e.g., judgment enforcement. If the community has no en-
forcer and individuals undertake the task, their coercive acts may become lawful since
they are employed for a valid community purpose. (This concept is broader than the
traditional doctrine of self-help, which is concerned only with the personal aspect rather
than the community aspect of the implementation of legal rights.) Thus, for example,
if state X refused to honor the immunity of judgment-defaulting state Y and trans-
ferred its assets to the judgment creditor, Y could not claim that X had acted unlaw-
fully. This line of reasoning, it is submitted, is sounder than a formulation of ex
delicto non oritur jus. The Corfu Channel Case has been adduced as contrary authority.
There, the United Kingdom petitioned the International Mine Clearance Board to
sweep the straits after the accident had occurred. The Board ordered a sweep subject
to Albanian consent. When Albania refused, the U.K. swept the mines over her
protest and subsequently presented them to the Court as evidence. The mines were
treated as admissible, but the Court ruled that the U.K. had violated Albanian sovereignty
in collecting them. However, the Court refused to sanction the U.K.; the only satis-
faction tendered Albania was the declaration of breached sovereignty: The Corfu
Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
32 See Arts. 41 and 42. Art. 5, dealing with suspension of membership rights of a
state against which enforcement action is being taken, is also an instrument of indirect
enforcement. Expulsion, a similar instrument (Art. 6), is generally deplored as an
inappropriate and ineffective sanction. See Jenks, "Some Constitutional Problems of
International Organizations," 22 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 1 (1945); Sohn, "Expulsion
or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization," 77 Harvard Law Rev.
1381 (1964). For the minority doctrinal view that suspension and/or expulsion are
appropriate sanctions, see Friedmann, op. cit. note 31 above at 88-94.
33 Only the briefest reference can be made to the vexed problem of sovereign im-
munity in this article. Sovereign immunity generally refers to the self-imposed bar of a
domestic court to impleading a foreign state before it. Hence the judicial doctrines
developed regarding sovereign immunity do not apply to most of the instances which
are discussed in this article. Not only is there no authority against executive attach-
ments, but state practice clearly demonstrates that it is held to be a lawful form of
self-help in international law (for citation of instances, see note 74 below). In regard
to the bar as applied in courts, it may be noted that it refers to impleading but not to
enforcing. Enforcement may be taken against immovable property and commercial
property if it is not used for diplomatic or consular purposes: "Competence of Courts
in Regard to Foreign States," Harvard Research in International Law (Jessup, re-
porter), 26 A.J.I.L. Supp. 707 (1932), and see the survey of cases and state practice
there. This is essentially the jus gestionis-jus imperii test, applied with varying
degrees of conformity in most national jurisdictions. See Lauterpacht, "The Problem
of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States," 28 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law, 220, 262
(1951); Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law,
passim (1959). The doctrine has been given overt application by American courts
since the "Tate Letter": Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteci-
mientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir., 1964). The restrictive construction of
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munity is granted to members of the international community who evi-
dence capacity and willingness to fulfill their obligations. Just as im-
munity from execution is not, semble, granted to an unrecognized state, 4
it should not be accorded to a delinquent state. Much of the doctrine and
practice of immunity hinges upon implications of reciprocity and retalia-
tion. Therefore, immunity should be pierced in fora insusceptible to
retaliation. If the judgment creditor, for example, pursues a strategy of
indirect enforcement aimed at a state-owned ship of the target, attachment
proceedings should be initiated in a port of call of a state which does not
send its own ships to the target state.
The contemporary problem in indirect enforcement is the lawfulness
of strategies. The unilateral guerre d'excution was lawful, under cer-
tain circumstances, until 1945. 5 The subsequent effect of Charter Article
2(4) 31 is ambiguous. If it is not construed as an absolute prohibition, then
only unlawful use of force is proscribed.37 Given the Charter's commit-
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, recommended by the Tate Letter, has been applied
to initial jurisdiction and will, presumably, be applied to subsequent enforcement.
34As in the preceding note, the immunity discussed here is to judgment enforcement
rather than to impleading. It is venerable precedent that an unrecognized state, as
well as one enjoying de jure or de facto recognition, cannot be impleaded against
its will in American courts: Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Government, 142 N.E.
569, 23 N.Y. 150; United States v. New York Trust Co., 108 F. Supp. 766, re-arg.
denied, 14 R.F.D. 186, aff'd., C.A., 208 F.2d 624, rev'd on other grounds, 75 S.Ct. 423,
348 U.S. 356. However, there would appear to be no bar to enforcement against an
unrecognized state. Such a state is one which, by definition, cannot maintain an ac-
credited embassy or consular mission. Hence, in theory at least, any of its property
within the territory of the enforcing state would be subject to judicial attachment.
Despite the absence of a formal bar, it is probably good policy to accord a do facto
immunity to that property which is actually being used for diplomatic and/or consular
purposes, though even this property might be seized if no other were available or if the
repudiation of the international judgment were especially gross.
35 In the Preferential Treatment of Claims of Blockading Powers Against Venezuela,
1904 (Germany, Great Britain and Italy v. Venezuela, Belgium, Spain, United States,
France, et al.), 9 U.N. Reports of Int. Arb. Awards 99, the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration upheld the lawfulness of a blockade of Venezuela for non-payment of debts,
and gave priority to the costs of the blockade. Even more in point is the Cerruti
case, in which Venezuela impugned an award, whereupon Italy bombarded her and
Venezuela complied, 11 ibid. 377. The Porter Convention of 1907 aimed at limiting
the use of force in the collection of contract debts. Art. I in fine provided, however,
that the Convention did not apply ". . .when the debtor state refuses or neglects to
reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any eompromis
from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration fails to submit to the award." Scott,
Reports to the Hague Conferences 1899 and 1907, pp. 489, 491 (1917). Under the
League of Nations Covenant, Arts. 12, 13 and 15, resort to war was limited to certain
contingencies, but a guerre d'exiution in the face of recalcitrant default was lawful.
s3Art. 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." But see Arts. 51 and 52.
37 Professor Waldock argues that Art. 2(4) constitutes an absolute prohibition of
the use of force: Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States
in International Law," 81 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 455, 492 (1962). In
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ment to adjudication, 3 coercive judgment enforcement might be lawful.
The criteria of a valid guerre d'ex6ction would be (1) exhaustion of all
possibilities of direct enforcement, (2) use of force commensurate with
the objective, (3) compliance with the laws of war, (4) a context showing
little likelihood of escalation. Use of the military strategy should, of
course, come under the aegis of an authoritative organization whenever
possible.
Some of the disillusionment with economic sanctions 39 can be traced to a
failure to clarify objectives. The economy of the target is rarely so de-
pendent upon external economies that such sanctions could strike its in-
dustrial base with the decisive impact of strategic bombing.40 Not infre-
an illumination of Art. 2(4) on policy grounds, MeDougal and Feliciano reach the
same conclusion: McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order
207-208 (1961). The late Judge Lauterpacht felt that the prohibition did not extend
to "the use of force in fulfillment of the obligation to give effect to the Charter . . .2':
2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law 154 (1952). Since judgment compliance
is an obligation of the Charter (Art. 94(1)), it would appear that Lauterpacht did
not rule out use of force to implement LC.J. decisions. Professor Stone argues that
Art. 2(4) prohibits only use of force "against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the U.N." It does not, however, prohibit its use for purposes consonant with the
Charter: Stone, Aggression and World Order 95 (1958). According to Judge Jessup,
international law tolerated self-help only because there was no international organiza-
tion competent to act in an emergency. With the establishment of the U.N., there
is such an organization, hence self-help is unlawful: Jessup, A Modern Law of
Nations 157 (1949). But this assumes an efficacious organ. In fact, as Kelsen, The
Law of the United Nations 269 (1950), and Judge Fitzmaurice have observed, "The
Charter frowns on self-help without . . .having put anything in its place." Fitz-
maurice, "The Foundation of the Authority of International Law and the Problem
of Enforcement," 19 Modern Law Rev. 1, 5 (1956). Thus, if Art. 2(4) is construed
as an absolute prohibition, it is probable that no force will be used to support inter-
national law.
V3 See U.N. Charter, Arts. 1, 33, 36, 92.
U- For a general critique of economic sanctions, see Taubenfeld and Taubenfeld, "The
Economic Weapon: The League and the United Nations," 1964 Proceedings, American
Society of International Law 183. A more sophisticated, though equally pessimistic
treatment is found in Galtung, C"On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,"
19 World Politics 378 (1966). In neither of these studies, it may be noted, is the
objective of economic sanctions stated in a satisfactory manner. Professor Galtung,
expressly, and the Taubenfelds, by implication, assume that the objectives of economic
sanctions are the disruption of the political organization of the target state. But
this is a rather out-dated view of the aims of any coercive strategy: see Schelling,
Arms and Influence (1966). Appropriately formulated, the aims of coercive strategies,
as of persuasive strategies, are to affect the perspectives of the target elites in such
manner that they conform to a desired pattern of behavior. In many circumstances,
the instrumental means may not require disruption of political organization; the
more modest the necessary means, the more attractive and potentially effective the
modality of economic sanctions. An appraisal of the use of economic sanctions against
South Africa and the many difficulties involved may be found in the working papers
included in Segal (ed.), Sanctions against South Africa (1965).
40Taubenfeld and Taubenfeld, Zoo. cit. note 39 above at 189. Galtung, Zoo. cit.
note 39 above, uses GNP and foreign trade statistics as a possible means of developing
a scale of vulnerability to economic sanctions. But since his focus comprehends more
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quently indiscriminate economic sanctions have strengthened rather than
weakened the target.4 - Economic strategies must be sharply honed to a
particular purpose. If, for example, political-economic analysis of the
target reveals that a wealth elite, with access to political power, can be
severely damaged by a particular sanction, that sanction alone should be
used in order to motivate the elite to pressure its government to comply.
Carefully planned sanctions may bring about compliance without the
dysfunctional results of the total embargo.
II
Five possible applications of the proposed enforcement system will be
briefly sketched. Attention is focused on the range of enforcers rather
than on the target. Potential combinations of authority and effective
power are designated where appropriate.
1. General Organizations: Article 94(2) of the Charter of the United
Nations provides that, in case of non-compliance with an I.C.J. judgment,
. . . the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San
Francisco, Cuba had proposed that the Statute be amended to allow a
judgment creditor to appeal total or partial non-compliance to the Council;
the Council would then be obliged to adopt measures necessary for execu-
tion.42  Opponents of the amendment argued that a state would have re-
course to the Council even without the amendment, in accordance with
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter."3 This argument failed to dissuade
Cuba and its supporters, since it conditioned enforcement action on a
finding of threat to or breach of the peace; this circumstance, however
defined, need not follow non-compliance. A compromise solution, Article
94(2), permitted recourse to the Council but made its subsequent enforce-
ment action discretionary."
The fundamental ambiguity of Article 94 lies not in itself but in its
than the economic features of the target-economy, he concludes that even states which
are highest on the vulnerability scale can draw upon other tangible and psychological
resources in order to mitigate the effects of the sanctions.
41 Taubenfeld, 7oc. cit. at 191. For a prediction of a like occurrence in South Africa
if sanctions are applied, see Marvin, "Sanctions against South Africa: the Impact
and the Aftermath," in Segal, op. cit. note 39 above, at 234-241.
-Doc. 2, G/14 (g), WD 41, 13 UN.C.I.O. 507 (Committee IV/I). The Cuban
delegate subsequently amended the proposal but in its amended form it remained sub-
stantially the same. The problem of enforcement had originally been raised by the
Committee of Jurists in Washington, which had suggested that some provision be
made for it in the proposed Charter. 14 U.N.C.I.O. 209, 210, 853.
43 13 ibid. 461.
44Tbid. The vote was 26-5; the voters are not cited in the record. Subsequently,
in the co-ordinating committee, the discretionary, as opposed to mandatory, enforcement
r6le of the Council was reinforced. ibi.
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relationship with the rest of the Charter.4 5  Security Council decisions
may commission armed force or measures short of such force only if peace
is threatened.4  Clearly not every act of non-compliance constitutes animminent threat to the peace. Were Article 94(2) an independent form
of action, by-passing the need for a finding of a threat to the peace, it
would have enormous constitutional and enforcement significance; on the
juridical level, at least, it would make the United Nations a real inter-
national enforcer. The matter has not been clarified by doctrine 7 or
practice.4 8  These as yet inextricable difficulties and the inordinate power
45 A frequent criticism of Art. 94(2) and one which was raised by supporters of the
Cuban amendment, was that the discretionary element in enforcement tended to under-
mine the authority of the Court. In fact, enforcement agents in any polity must have
a wide discretion in choosing which cases to enforce and what means to employ. See
note 20 above. Art. 13(4) of the Covenant, it may be noted, fixed a mandatory duty
to enforce; the League Council in the Hungarian-Rumanian Optants Case treated the
article as discretionary and did not enforce. 8 League of Nations Official Journal
1379 ff. (1927).
46 See U.N. Charter, Ch. 7.
47 Paradoxically, it is the U.S.S.R., adamantly opposed to international adjudication,
which has consistently argued that Art. 94(2) is a separate form of action; the
United States has construed the article as contingent on a threat to the peace. At
the U.N. Conference in 1945, the Russian representative, Golunsky, commenting on the
final draft of the provision, said it "1. . . made a considerable change in the functions
of the Security Council. Formerly, the Security Council had jurisdiction only in
matters concerned with the maintenance of peace and security. This Article would
give the Council authority to deal with matters which might have nothing to do with
security." 17 U.N.C.I.O. 97. The American representative, Dr. Pasvolsky, countered
that there was a ". . . close connection" between the enforcement provision and what
is now Ch. VII, and he wondered if there was a necessity for duplication. Ibid. at 98.
Subsequently, as the State Department's representative before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Pasvolsky said in regard to Art. 94(2) that "The Council may
proceed, I suppose, to call upon the country concerned to carry out the judgment, but
only if the peace of the world is threatened, and if the Council has made a determina-
tion to that effect." Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, on the Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., July 9-13,
1945 (Revised) at 286. Green Hackworth took the same position, ibid. at 331-332.
The Russian position, as stated by Professor Korovin in 1946, is that "Execution of
the decisions of the tribunal are guaranteed by the Security Council with all the means
at its disposal." Korovin, "The Second World War and International Law," 40
A.J.I.L. 742 (1946).
48 The only instance in which Art. 94(2) was invoked is an interjudicial phase of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case. Pursuant to a request by the United Kingdom, the Court
had indicated interim measures, enjoining Iran to postpone implementation of its
nationalization until the case was heard on the merits. [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 89. Iran
ignored the ruling and proceeded with the nationalization: Ford, The Anglo-Iranian
Oil Dispute of 1951-1952, p. 277 (1954). The U.K. responded by lodging the matter in
the Security Council under Arts. 33, 36 and 94(2). U.N. Security Council, 6th Year,
Official Records, Supp., Doe. S/2357 (1951). The prolonged and inconclusive pro-
cedural discussion which followed permitted Iran to flout irremediably the prescribed
interim measures. Subsequently the U.K. submitted a revised draft resolution, with
no direct reference to Art. 94(2). Speaking for the U.K., Sir Gladwyn Jebb said:
1.... there is not much point in our now suggesting that the Government of Iran
should be called upon 'to act in all respects in conformity with the provisional mea-
sures by the Court' . . . .they have, unfortunately, and to some extent now been over-
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of the permanent members of the Council suggest that the United Nations
cannot function as the world's sheriff.49
2. Functional Organizations: Functional agencies linked to the United
Nations have committed themselves to assist the Security Council in the
execution of Chapter VII of the Charter 0 The reluctance of many of
the agencies to obligate themselves is reflected in their qualified duty to
support as expressed in many of the Special Agreements. 1 In certain
instances, a directive from the Council does initiate automatic sanctions
within the agency's operational arena.5 2  The economic agencies, which
have control over assets of states and which hence can enforce by direct
substitution, retained a discretion as to whether and by what means they
will implement Security Council directives.5 3
A Council directive would accord a high authority to agency enforce-
ment and, at the same time, shift the onus of primary responsibility. It
taken by events." U.N. Security Council, 6th Year, Official Records, S/P.V. 560,
pp. 1-2 (1951).
49 The potential enforcement r6le of the General Assembly, exercising its "secondary
responsibility" for keeping the peace and acting under the "Uniting for Peace Resolu-
tion" (General Assembly Ress. 377 (V)), requires an examination which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Should one of the veto Powers block action under Art. 94(2) in
the Council, it is not unlikely that the Assembly Will arrogate an enforcement r0le.
For discussion of Assembly jurisdiction in such circumstances, see Reisman, "Revision
of the South West Africa Cases," 7 Virginia J. Int. Law 4, 26-38 (1966).
-0Art. 48(2) of the Charter envisaged a network with other international agencies
for enforcement purposes "1. .by including in the agreement with each specialized
agency an undertaking to assist the Security Council, upon its request, in the applica-
tion of measures envisaged in Article 41 of the Charter." Report of the Preparatory
Commission of the United Nations, Ch. III, sec. 5(19) (1946). For a discussion of
the problems involved in the negotiation of these agreements, see Sharp, "The Special-
ized Agencies and the United Nations: Progress Report I," 1 International Organiza-
tion 460, 467 (1947), and idem, "Progress Report II," 2 ibid. 247 (1948).
53 Thus, the Universal Postal Union wanted no links whatsoever with the U.N. and
acceded to a nexus only under strong diplomatic pressure. Codding, Universal Postal
Union 218-220 (1964). In a number of other cases, the agency in question succeeded
in retaining total discretion as to response to a Security Council directive. Thus,
while I.C.A.O. " .... agrees to cooperate ... in rendering such assistance to the
Security Council as that Council may request, including assistance in carrying out
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security" (8 U.N. Treaty Series 324, 330), the Special Agreement with the
I.M.F. does no more than take note of the obligations of its component members
under Art. 48 (2) and state that the Fund will I I... have due regard for decisions of
the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 .. ." Art. 6(1), Agreement between
the United Nations and the International Monetary 1und, 16 U.N. Treaty Series 328,
332 (1948).
52 For example, Art. 7 of the I.C.A.O. Special Agreement, 8 U.N. Treaty Series 324,
330, and Arts. 87 and 88, Convention on International Civil Aviation (T.I.A.S., No.
1591), 15 U.N. Treaty Series 295, 354.
53 See Art. 6(1), Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Monetary Fund, Zoo. cit., and Art. 6(1), Agreement between the United Nations and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 16 U.N. Treaty Series,
346, 350 (1948). For a textual analysis of the Special Agreements, see Aufricht,
"Suppression of Treaties in International Law," 37 Cornell Law Q. 691 (1952).
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may also be possible to by-pass the Council and undertake enforcement
directly through the agencies. In the economic agencies, for example,
every member state has a "current account" in gold and national cur-
rency.54 The judgment creditor might move the agency to attach these
funds or to transfer target funds to the account of the creditor. Such
a strategy can anticipate resistance from the agencies. From their point
of view, national currency is their working capital. Under certain cir-
cumstances, however, they might be persuaded to view the matter other-
wise. If, for example, the target state announced that it intended to
withdraw, the currency would change character 5 ; the agency might be
less reluctant to transfer it to the account of the judgment creditor. It
might also be persuaded to co-operate if it were probable that mere pre-
liminary moves to attach would impel the target to comply voluntarily.
The agencies have an aversion to the politicization of their activities, hence
they might be exhorted to initiate an interpleader by paying the money
into Court.5 6 Finally, although the agencies enjoy a strong procedural
immunity, 7 there may be some possibility of municipal court action
against the funds they hold.
3. Regional Organizations: The political interdependence which fre-
quently precedes the constitution of regional organizations makes a re-
gional state quite vulnerable to the concerted action of its neighbors.
Thus, in the recent Honduras-Nicaragua border war, peripheral pressure
from other O.A.S. Members 5 brought the disputants to The Hague and
ultimately secured voluntary compliance.5 9 In the Algeria-Morocco border
war of 1963, efforts of the Organization of African Unity brought the
parties to arbitration and continued until there was compliance with the
54 See Art. 2(2), (3) and (5), Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (T.I.A.S., No. 1502), 2 U.N. Treaty Series 136-138
(1947); Art. 2, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (T.I.A.S.,
No. 1501), 2 U.N. Treaty Series 42 (1947).
V, Thus, under Art. 6(2), Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (lee. cit. at 172), the Bank must repurchase the shares
of a withdrawing member.
s6 On the possibility of an international interpleader action through the I.CJ., on
the analogy of the Monetary Gold Case, see note 73 below.
r7 Art. 9(3), and (4), Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
7ec. cit. 74; Art. 7(4), Articles of Agreement of the International Bank, 7ec. cit. 180.
For a survey of such immunities in practice, see Jenks, International Immunities
(1961).
58 See New York Times, May 3, 1957, p. 1, col. 3; Feb. 27, p. 13, col. 2; March 17,
p. 42, col. 5; April 20, p. 8, col. 4; April 30, p. 14, col. 2; May 19, p. 26, col. 5; May
31, p. 6, col. 5. See also "Situation between Honduras and Nicaragua," 9 Annals of
the Organization of American States 264 (1957). For a legal evaluation of the post-
adjudicative stage, see Fenwick, "Honduras-Nicaragua Boundary Dispute," 51 A.J.I.L.
761-763 (1957).
r9 Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made By The King of Spain 23 December
1906, [1960) I.C.J. Rep. 492. For a summary of the events leading to compliance, see
New York Times, Nov. 16, 1960, p. 1, col. 6; Nov. 19, p. 1, col. 8; Nov. 27, p. 30, col.
5; Jan. 14, 1961, p. 3, col. 6; Jan. 15, p. 5, col. 1; Jan. 28, p. 3, Col 6; Feb. 19, p.
30, col. 1; May 14, p. 26, col. 1.
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award.60  Thus, judgment creditors may initiate diplomatic activity within
a regional organization with the specific aim of mobilizing its aid in en-
forcement.
Fundamental international norms recognize the primary security right
of regional organizations. 1 A judgment creditor planning an enforcement
action alone or in concert with other states may seek to gain a preliminary
authorization from the relevant regional organization. This strategy is
particularly desirable when an authorization procedure will be blocked
in the United Nations.
4. Nation-states: Nation-states, the primary repositories of effective
power, are the most promising candidates for functional enforcement.
Although a disinclination to become involved in the affairs of others pre-
vails, the duty to aid in enforcing community decisions is a "general
principle of law." 62 The Treaty of Washington0 8 and the Alabama
award 64 are clear holdings that failure to prevent another's non-compli-
ance with international law is, itself, a delict against the state suffering
the original breach. Subsequent American practice is consonant with this
principle.6 5
Judicial Action: If assets of the target state are found in state X, it
may be possible to employ X's courts to enforce the international judg-
ment. Certain writers have asserted that national enforcement of I.C.J.
judgments is a principle of customary international law.00 Yet the lead-
0o For background, see Boutros-Ghali, "The Addis Ababa Charter," 546 Interna-
tional Conciliation (1964); Time, Oct. 25, Nov. 1, 1963; New York Times, Oct. 4,
1963, p. 2, col 4; Oct. 10, p. 10, col. 2; Oct. 12, p. 4, col 5; Oct. 15, p. 5, col. 4 and p.
1, col. 8. The " Neutral Declaration" of Oct. 31, 1963, which served as a compromis,
may be found in Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1963, p. 2, col. 1. Although it has been stated
that the dispute has been resolved, "Racism at the United Nations," 151 New Re-
public 9-10 (Dee. 26, 1964), reports that it continues.
61 See U.N. Charter, Arts. 33 and 51-54. The trend toward increasing independence
of certain regional organizations from the Security Council has generally been justified
by extensive interpretation of the right of self-defense. Although this is a strong
legal argument, it tends to minimize the problem of the level of coercion employed in
self-defense.
62Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the Court enumerates as one of the sources of inter-
national law "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." In all
municipal systems abetting non-compliance is unlawful. In some systems failure
to aid enforcers, unaccompanied by an intention to abet non-compliance, is unlawful.
3 2 Moore, International Arbitrations 547 ff. See, in particular, Art. VI-lules,
at 549-550.
64 For text of the award, see Moore, op. cit. at 653-659.
65 On several occasions, the United States did not apply the Monroe Doctrine when
Latin American states invoked it against attacking European Powers. Taft Papers
on the League of Nations 269. In general, it would appear that mutual defense
treaties against acts of aggression would be inoperative in the case of use of force to
implement judgments, an a fortiori application of its validity in the collection of
contract debts.
6s For a categorical presentation, see Rosenne, The International Court of Justice
87-88 (1957). More guarded statements may be found in Schachter, "The Enforce-
ment of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions," 54 A.J.I.L. 1, 14 (1960),
and Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 709-710 (1964). Such an
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ing case is somewhat equivocal. In Socobelge,67 an award gained by a
Belgian company against the Greek Government was subsequently upheld
by the Permanent Court.68 In 1950, Socobelge instituted garnishment
proceedings against moneys owing to the Greek Government in Belgium,
on the basis of the international judgment. The Belgian Tri'buna Civil
assimilated the P.C.LJ. judgment to all other foreign judgments, refusing
execution de plano.69 Municipal judicial enforcement is not excluded by
this holding, neither is it facilitated by it.
Joint Executive Action: The co-ordinated action of several national
executives may be an effective enforcement strategy. The impact of freez-
ing assets, attachment, cessation of aid, severance of diplomatic relations
and trade blockades can be compounded if undertaken multilaterally.
Moreover, co-ordinated enforcement augments the authority of the ac-
tion.70 The authority of a specific enforcement program can be further
increased by the incorporation of an extant organization. Thus, several
states might initiate an interpleader action with the International Court
of Justice. The Statute makes no express provision for such procedure
and the Court will probably disseise jurisdiction if the target state
refuses to join issue."1 Therefore, the joint interpleader must be expressly
obligation is eminently logical, but there is, unfortunately, no international authority
for the rule. In the Chorz6w Factory (Merits) case, the Permanent Court held that
a municipal court did not have the power to invalidate an international judgment.
Series A/No. 17 at 33. From this one may infer that a municipal court nay not act
contrary to an I.C.J. judgment, but it is difficult to deduce that it must act.
67 Socobelge v. 2tat Helldnique, Belgium, Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles, April 30, 1951.
1951 Int. Law Rep. 3 (1957); 47 A.J.I.L. 508 (1953).
65 Soci6t6 Commerciale de Belgique, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78.
69 The Court held: "De lege ferenda such an exemption from exeguatur seems con-
ceivable or even legitimate. However, at the present time, no international arrangement
has introduced such a principle into the Belgian legal system. The plaintiff Company
claims that the Permanent Court is not a 'foreign tribunal,' but a 'superior tribunal,'
common to all states which have accepted its Statute, and that as such its decisions
do not require exequatur. However, in the absence of an independent power of
execution belonging to that Court, which would enable litigants before it to execute
its decisions de piano, these decisions are not exempt from the servitude imposed on
Belgian territory on decisions of other than Belgian tribunals." Ibid. at 4. A more
extreme negative position was taken by the court of appeal of the International
Tribunal of Tangier in Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. v. Lal-la Fatma and others,
21 Int. Law Rep. 136 (1954). The plaintiff sought to derive municipal rights from
the 1.C.J.'s judgment in Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco, [1952]
I.C.J. Rep. 176. The Court refused to derive such, holding that .. . . such decisions
[of the I.C.J.] might at best provide inspiration and guidance, although not because
its judgments have any binding force in municipal courts"; ibid. at 137. For a
purportedly different municipal treatment of the same case, see Administration des
Habous v. Deal, 19 Tnt. Law Rep. 342 (1952) (Morocco, Court of Appeal).
7oCf. Tammes, "Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International
Law," 94 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 265, 286 (1958).
71 In emphasizing the consensual nature of their jurisdiction, both the P.C.I.J. and
the I.C.S. have been reluctant to assert jurisdiction in the absence of one of the parties
in interest. In the Status of Eastern Carelia case (P.C.LJ., Series B, No. 5 at 7),
the Council of the League requested an advisory opinion on the disputed boundary
19691
HeinOnline -- 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 19 1969
THE A3ERIOAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
contingent on the target's submission to jurisdiction. If the target sub-
mits, the other states agree to abide by the decision. If the target refuses
to submit, the other parties will transfer the attached assets to the original
judgment creditor. There is a rough-hewn precedent for this procedure.
After Albania impugned the Corfu (hanneZ judgment,7 2 the Allied Powers
asked the Court to determine -whether monetary gold taken from Rome
was Albanian. If it 'were, the parties agreed to transfer it to the United
Kingdom in fulfillment of the Corfu judgment.73
Unilateral Executive Action: Many of the strategies discussed above
may be taken unilaterally. The fact that they are employed in judgment
enforcement will probably render them lawful. 4 Unilateral action is
between the U.S.S.R. and Finland. The U.S.S.R. was neither a Member of the League
nor did it consent to the advisory opinion. Theoretically consent was not necessary
in this case, since the opinion would have constituted no more than an advisory opinion
to the Council. Nevertheless, the Court construed the request as a de facto contentious
submission and refused to seise jurisdiction in the absence of Russian agreement. In
the first phase of the Peace Treaties case (Zoo. cit. note 8 above), the defendants had
sought to invoke Eastern Carelia as a precedent for the rule that there can be no
judicial proceeding (contentious or advisory) without the consent of the states in-
volved. The Court rejected this objection, holding that consent was not required in
advisory proceedings. Nevertheless, in the second phase of the case, the Court refused
to sanction appointment of the national arbitrator by the Secretary General, an outcome
which is, in terms of effect, indistinguishable from a denial of jurisdiction. For a
discussion of the Monetary Gold case, see note 73 below.
72 This case arose out of an incident in which British warships passing through the
Straits of Corfu struck mines, resulting in serious loss of life and damage to the ships.
Subsequently the U.K. swept the straits and discovered mines, which had apparently
been laid recently. In its decision on the merits, the Court held that Albania was re-
sponsible under international law for the loss of life and damages sustained by the
British ships, but that in sweeping the straits the U.K. had violated Albanian sovereignty.
[1949] I.CJ. Rep. 4. In the final phase of the case, the Court rejected Albania's
challenge to its jurisdiction to assess damages and awarded the U.K. £843,947.
[1949] I.0.J. Rep. 244.
7 Monetary gold, taken from Rome by the Germans in 1943, became part of the
Allied Gold Pool. According to the Paris Reparation Agreement of 1946, it was to
be distributed to states entitled to it. The Tripartite Commission, created by Part III
of the Agreement, could not resolve the competing claims of Albania and Italy to the
Roman gold. The Washington Agreement of April 25, 1951, and the accompanying
Washington Statement (T.I.A.S., No. 2252) concluded by the Three Powers, referred
the claims to an arbitrator and provided that, should he rule in favor of Albania,
the gold would be transmitted to the United Kingdom unless either Italy or Albania,
within ninety days of the award, requested the I.C.5. to adjudicate its rights. Italy,
but not Albania, submitted to the Court, and followed its own submission with an
objection to jurisdiction. Italy averred that the suit was directed against Albania,
which was not a party before the Court. The Court accepted the Italian objection-
incorrectly, it is believed-and disseised itself of jurisdiction. Case of the Monetary
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question), [1954] I.C.3T. Rep. 19.
74 Attachment of assets and freezing foreign assets for future claims is a frequent
international occurrence. The Peace Treaties of 1947 gave the Allies the right to
seize enemy property in their territory, liquidate it and apply the proceeds to claims
brought by them and their nationals against the enemy. See Fitzmaurice, "The
Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties," 73 Hague Academy, Recuoil des Cours 324
(1948). The United States and the United Kingdom froze a total of some $470,000,000
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subject to retaliation in kind, a danger minimized in joint action. Uni-
lateral force should, when possible, be sanctioned by an organization prior
to application.
5. Private Action: The automatic responses of individuals to an im-
pugned judgment may conceal a sanction potential. Expectations of sta-
bility, upon which international economic interaction depends, are shaken
by a challenge to global authority. Transnational commerce tends to flee
from instability. Thus, the effect of non-compliance may be an instinctive
commercial and economic withdrawal, which imposes a serious deprivation
upon the impugning state. The aggregate international securities market
is a rather reliable index of investor perspectives. When the U.S.S.R.
arranged a patently corrupt arbitration award against Jordan Petroleum
of Israel,7' the international credit status of Russia fell.76  The U.S.S.R.
was subjected to a short-term sanction. Private sanctions may be intensi-
fied and sustained by publicly communicating an intention to pursue en-
foreement action. This, in turn, may engender voluntary compliance.
III
Functional enforcement is not an end in itself but a means for (1)
securing present compliance with international law and (2) generating
expectations of effectiveness ultimately crucial to the formation of a
centralized enforcing authority. To this dual end the following five prin-
ciples should be brought to bear upon every enforcement move.
of Egyptian assets after the Suez crisis. Domke, "American Protection against
Foreign Expropriation in the Light of the Suez Canal Crisis," 105 Univ. of Pa. Law
Rev. 1033, 1039 (1957). The United States froze and ultimately attached Bulgarian
assets, which were allocated to claimants against Bulgaria by the U. S. Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. Lillich, "The United States-Bulgarian Claims Agreement of
1963," 58 A.J.I.L. 686 (1964). For similar action against Czech assets in this
country following a Czech nationalization, see "Completion of Czechoslovakian Claims
Program under Title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 as Amended,"
17 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 140 ff. (1962). For similar action against
Cuban assets, see Claims Against Cuba: Public Law 88-666; 78 Stat. 1110, Sees.
501-512. For legislative history as well as for State Department comments touching
directly on the lawfulness of such strategies, see 16 U. S. Code, Congressional and
Administrative News, Nov. 5, 1964, at 5241. In regard to the general lawfulness of
these strategies, see Schachter, "The Enforcement of International Judicial and
Arbitral Decisions," loc. cit. 7-8: ". . . if the successful state is free under inter-
national law unilaterally to apply coercive measures against the recalcitrant state
.. . it should be free to seize assets of the debtor state within its control for the
purpose of satisfying an award of damages. Even if the award does not call for
monetary compensation, it would seem to be open to the winning state to attach
assets in order to bring about compliance by the creditor state."
75 For text of the award, see Domke, "The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration," 53 A.J.I.L.
787, 800 (1959). For some description of the proceedings, see New York Times, June
20, 1958, p. 1, col. 1. For more detailed description, see Domke, Zoo. cit., and "Arbi-
tration of State-Trading Relations," 24 Law and Contemporary Problems 317, 322-324
(1959).
76 For a survey of the reaction of the general and business community as related
in the international press, see Domke, "Arbitration of State-Trading Relations," Zoo.
cit. above, at 324, note 57.
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1. Substitutive Enforcement. The objects of numerous international
disputes often remain in the control of the losing party. Seizing and
transferring them may require a degree of force which is impractical. In
an increasingly interdependent world, control over other assets of any
state is often divided among a number of other states. Given a scale of
equivalence, such as that of international commerce, substitutes can be
found in lieu of the original object of the dispute. Substitution should
be sought insofar as it reflects the subjective valuation of the litigants.
2. Anticipatory Enforcement. Although fixed-and-flow resources may
be valuated, they enjoy a primacy among nation-states which does not
admit of substitution. Moreover, in certain non-territorial disputes, the
winning litigant may gain substitutive enforcement, yet the loser, by re-
taining the subject of litigation, frustrates the attempted resolution of the
conflict. Hence provision should be made for anticipatory enforcement.
Administrative control of the territory in dispute could be transferred
to an international authority while the matter was sub judice. On a more
modest scale the forces of the occupying litigant could be evacuated during
proceedings. Provisions such as these must be made in the compromis.
In non-territorial disputes earnest may be prepaid into court. Where
liquidity problems or restricted monetary policies make this unfeasible, the
compromis may make elaborate provision for garnishment; third-party
debtors should be privy to a separate protocol. Alternatively, protocols
can arrange liens on national funds held by international banks and de-
velopment organizations. 77
3. Expeditious Enforcement.8  An enforcement system is ultimately
grounded upon the expectation that the system works. A lag between
judgment and enforcement tends to diminish this expectation and to in-
crease resistance to voluntary compliance. Enforcement strategies, de-
vised pendente lite, should be launched promptly. If only moderate
resistance to compliance is anticipated, the preferred strategy may be one
which, though not optimum, is the quickest demonstration of intention.
Dispatch can also prevent domestic politicization of compliance decisions."'
77 See Jenks, "1Some Legal Aspects of the Financing of International Institutions,
28 Grotius Society Transactions 113-115 (1942).
78 A corollary to principle 3 is that exacerbating enforcement should be avoided.
Excessive haste in setting an enforcement program in operation may backfire. The
law generally presumes good faith; the manifest intention to enforce implies a suspicion
of the bona fides of the loser. The loser may dismiss such a communication as a
gross indiscretion. However, resentments may be aroused which will impede compli-
ance or cool subsequent relations. The decision to reveal an enforcement program
should be preceded by an assessment of the loser's attitude. If it leans toward com-
pliance or if divulging enforcement intention will strengthen the hands of a domestic
anti-compliance faction, the plan should be suppressed. The revelation or suppression
of an enforcement plan is, in itself, a strategy and should be employed only when
conditions are auspicious.
79In the Alabama award (Zoo. cit. note 64 above), the British Government was
anxious to comply, but the time lag between judgment and compliance permitted the
domestic opposition to goad popular passions against the award. 2 Moore, Interna-
tional Arbitrations 664 ff.
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4. Avoid Coercive IRdirect Enforcement. Enlightened self-interest as
well as humanitarianism militates against coercive strategies. It is a com-
monplace that violence is contagious. Moreover, unilateral military action
can trigger escalation. Coercion rarely resolves disputes; more often it
deepens the rancor and hostility of both parties. Paradoxically, pro-
ponents of peace, who genuinely abhor violence, must at times resort to it
in order to protect the principles and institutions they cherish. There
will undoubtedly be instances in which highly coercive strategies alone
promise success, but they should be employed only as a last resort.
5. Community Participation. Although international self-help measures
are not inherently unlawful, an enforcement program, particularly one
coercive in nature, should draft as wide a participation as possible. A
united community tends to isolate the defaulting party, to magnify its
unlawful act and to lend a corporate sanction to any indirect action. It
emphasizes responsible commitment to the validity of judgments and
creates an image of integrated enforcement.
IV
Securing enforcement of a particular decision in the contemporary inter-
national arena depends ultimately upon the ingenuity, resourcefulness and
energy of the winning party. A functional orientation to the problem
does not create the need for self-reliance; it merely underlines its catalytic
value and suggests means for achieving the desired end. Self-interest-
enlightened or otherwise-is the motive force in international law. 0
Demonstrations of the inclusive community interest in the enforcement
of judgments will receive verbal assent. But such demonstration alone
will not draft the collaboration of others in a particular enforcement
program. In bilateral disputes, non-involvement is often the most ex-
pedient and economical course of action. One of the key practical prob-
lems of functional enforcement, then, is how to facilitate the drafting of
other participants and their resources in an enforcement action.
Given the grid of potential enforcers, sketched earlier, a number of
minor institutional changes can facilitate functional enforcement. Draft-
manship promises greatest success when it avoids the glorious but un-
realizable and concentrates on tooling available resources in order to
maximize their public order effect. Two areas present themselves as
fertile for the formal agreement process: the International Court of
Justice and the network of national, territorially-based courts.
The authority of the International Court could be extended into the
post-judicial phase by a number of minor amendments to the Statute and
Rules. In its current form, the Statute gives the Court no explicit role
in the enforcement process.8' In fact, as was noted earlier, the Court's
o0McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 173 (1963).
81 But Art. 60 of the Statute, after stating that the "judgment is final and without
appeal," continues: "In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the
judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party." One can as-
sume, without violence to the express language of the provision, that many problems
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practice indicates a refined sensitivity to the problem of subsequent com-
pliance . 2  Consideration of the post-adjudicative phase is permitted by
general judicial practice 83 and not prohibited by the language of the
Statute. Yet reluctance to play an active r6le in this phase can be
traced to the absence of express authorization. This could be supplied by
a minor, declaratory amendment to the Statute.
By additions to Articles 56 and 60 of the Statute, the Court could be
empowered, in its discretion, to include a specific time-limit or a general
guideline for compliance. After the expiration of such time or on the
initiative of the winner, the winning party could reapply unilaterally for
a declaration of non-compliance. It would be possible to the losing party
to (1) claim compliance, (2) aver reasons for delay and request an exten-
sion, (3) as a counter-claim seek permission for substitutive compliance.
A finding by the Court of non-compliance would tend to undermine the
position of the loser, emphasize the finality of the judgment and expedite
coercive enforcement. A finding by the Court of justification of delay
would tend to lower the crisis level of the dispute and maximize the possi-
bility of a just settlement acceptable to both parties. An allowance for
substitutive compliance would have a similar effect.
Among the more general effects of such amendments would be the
additional room for maneuver allowed the Court. The possibility of re-
considering the operative part of its judgment and its effects would permit
the Court to act initially with more confidence and carry through its
judgment with more flexibility. It might also increase resort to the Court,
since states, generally doubtful of the Court's appreciation of the complex
political problems involved in complying with a judgment, could make
these the subject of a separate phase of adjudication. The amendment
would also tend to depoliticize the post-adjudicative phase by keeping it
"in court" until resolution had been achieved.
in regard to compliance or enforcement would be included here. See, in this regard,
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the Asylum
Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 395, involving a sequence of the dispute in large part con-
cerned with the appropriate manner of execution of a previous judgment. See also
Chorz6w Factory (Merits) case, A/17, and compare with the jurisdictional phase: A/9.
Insofar as one accepts impossibility of performance as a classic ground for revision,
Art. 61 of the Statute can be said to serve a parallel function of allowing the Court
to intervene in phases subsequent to judgment.
82 See notes 6 and 7 above.
88 In the Corfu Channel Cas3, the International Court rejected an Albanian objection
to jurisdiction to determine damages, by holding that its initial finding of jurisdiction
in the first phase of the case extended to all aspects of the adjudication. [1949]
I.C.J. Rep. 244, 248. In this regard see also Case Concerning Certain German Interests
in Polish Upper Silesia, Series A/6 at 21, and Series A/I at 34-35. Note should be
taken of any earlier formulatory style in international compromis, which expressly
empowered international tribunals to resolve enforcement difficulties. See, in this re-
gard, Art. 9 of the "Agreement Between Prance, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal
for the Arbitration of Claims relating to Religious Properties," July 13, 1913, 8
A-.J.I.L. Supp. 165-168 (1914), and "General Arbitration Treaty Between the Re-
public of Colombia and the Argentine Republic," Jan. 20, 1912, ibid. 86-88.
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A consideration of the emendation of the Statute and Rules in this
manner is a project eminently suited to the International Law Commis-
sion. The Court itself could consider it in accord with Article 70 of the
Statute."' A working draft of the proposed amendments is given in an
appendix to this article.
The enforcement r6le of municipal courts could also be facilitated by a
declaratory formal agreement. It is surprising, to say the least, that the
municipal status of an international judgment should have remained in
doubtful ambiguity. Although doctrinal writers manifest a general con-
sensus,85 the Socobelge case, discussed earlier,86 indicates the continuing
confusion. Sustained efforts at securing the national enforcement of for-
eign arbitral awards have not extended to international judgments.8 "
Article 54 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 18
is an appropriate model for rendering judgments of the International
Court enforceable eo ipso in municipal courts. According to this provision,
awards of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
are automatically enforceable in domestic courts. The measure could be
further facilitated by appropriate internal implementing legislation by
each contracting state.8 9 This is another matter appropriate for considera-
tion by the International Law Commission. A recommended draft is ap-
pended to this article.
V
International enforcement is neither impossible nor so difficult and
uneconomical as to be unfeasible. Even were it so, the lawyer could not
claim discharge from the burden of dealing with it. Law, in any socially
84 Art. 70 provides: "IThe Court shall have power to propose such amendments to the
present Statute as it may deem necessary, through written communications to the
Secretary-General, for consideration in conformity with the provisions of Article 69."
s5 See note 66 above.
86 See note 68 and text there.
87 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N. Treaty Series 158.
No. 678; Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26,
1927, 92 ibid. 302, No. 2096; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N. Treaty Series 38.
88 4 Int. Legal Materials 532 (1965); 60 A.J.I.L. 892 (1966).
9 Consider in this regard Art. 192, Euratom Treaty, 298 U.N. Treaty Series 167,
218, and the corresponding Art. 86 in the E.C.S.C. Treaty, 261 ibid. 140, 173. Citation
of the municipal legislative measures concerning forced execution of the judgments
of the European Court can be found in Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Com-
munities 244-245 (1962). A particularly useful example is found in the implementing
legislation in the United States for the Arbitral Convention of the International Bank
(lc. cit. note 88 above), Sec. 3(a) of which provides: "An award of an arbitral
tribunal rendered pursuant to Chapter IV of the convention shall create a right arising
under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an
award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the
award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several
States .. ." P.L. 89-532, 80 Stat. 344. See also House of Representatives, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Hearing
at 9-11.
19691
HeinOnline -- 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 25 1969
TE A.MERICAN JOURNAL OP INTERNATIONAL LAW
significant sense, requires that there be, at the bare minimum, an ex-
pectation of effectiveness, if not a point-for-point correlation between de-
cision and allocation. Creating and sustaining that expectation is a basic
legal function.
Effective law does not depend exclusively on operating enforcement
mechanisms. In the most fundamental sense, it depends upon predispo-
sitions among an effective majority of participants towards compliance
with authority. Any developmental enforcement program must number
among its principal aims the inculcation of such perspectives. But in
order to overcome the conditions which will be encountered in transna-
tional periods, the international lawyer requires a comprehensive grasp of
legal and social process as well as consideration, in the performance of each
legal function, of its relation to and impact on all the others. Thus, for
example, the adjudicative phase will not produce a highly unenforceable
decision; the prescriptive phase will consider an appropriate timetable
for its programs and, hence, avoid ineffectiveness and so on. Yet, the
crucial r6le of enforcement must be accepted, its concern to the lawyer
confirmed and the inadequacies of its current conceptualization conceded.
The development of a viable enforcement system will be a delicate,
complicated process which will require a long and arduous period of ap-
plication before a high degree of conformity with international law can
be expected as a matter of course. But it must be undertaken. A right
without a remedy, as Justice Holmes said, is no right at all. An inter-
national law system which deems itself so incapable of effective decision
that it must retreat from the most critical cases cannot meet the require-
ments of a world community increasingly in need of legal order.
APPENDIX 1
A. Article 56 of the Statute, in its present form, states:
1. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.
2. It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part
in the decision.
The proposed amendment will add subsection 3, as follows:
3. The Court, on its own motion or upon application of any party,
may, if it deems necessary, specify principles to govern compliance or
execution of its judgments. These may include a period for compli-
ance, a time-table for compliance, general principles of compliance or
any other directive which the Court may deem appropriate.
B. Article 59 of the Statute, in its present form, states:
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.
The proposed amendment will add:
But for purposes of enforcement, a judgment is deemed to create an
actionable right in any domestic organ of a State party to the Statute
as well as in any international organ.
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C. Article 60a which will be added after Article 60, will state:
In the event of any dispute as to the fact or manner of compliance,
either party may apply to the Court.
APPENDIX 2
Draft Protocol for the Enforcement of I.C.J. Judgments
1. The undersigned States parties to this protocol, in the interests of
ensuring enforcement of the judgments of the International Court of
Justice, declare that
a. The enforcement of an international judgment is the obligation of
all States parties to the Statute.
b. A judgment of the International Court creates rights and duties,
automatically enforceable under international law and, without any in-
corporation, reception or such procedure, in municipal law.
c. No claim of sovereign immunity can avail against the execution,
in any forum, of a judgment of the International Court of Justice.
2. Accordingly, signatories to this protocol undertake
a. to take all general or particular measures which are necessary and
appropriate for the enforcement of international judgments, in all cases
in which such enforcement is sought in State organs;
b. to enact such internal legislation as is necessary to require domestic
courts and tribunals to enforce international judgments, and rights arising
thereon, solely and exclusively upon certification of the authenticity of
said judgment.
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